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GREGORY OF NYSSA
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS
CHAPTER I
A SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF S. GREGORY OF NYSSA.
IN the roll of the Nicene Fathers there is no more honoured name than that
of Gregory of Nyssa. Besides the praises of his great brother Basil and of
his equally great friend Gregory Nazianzen, the sanctity of his life, his theoIogical
learning, and his strenuous advocacy of the faith embodied in the Nicene clauses,
have received the praises of Jerome, Socrates, Theodoret, and many other Christian
writers. Indeed such was the estimation in which he was held that some did
not hesitate to call him 'the Father of Fathers' as well as 'the Star of Nyssa
(1).'
Gregory of Nyssa was equally fortunate in his country, the name he bore, and
the family which produced him. He was a native of Cappadocia, and was born
most probably at Caesarea, the capital, about A.D. 335 or 336. No province
of the Roman Empire had in those early ages received more eminent Christian
bishops than Cappadocia and the adjoining district of Pontus.
In the previous century the great prelate Firmilian, the disciple and friend
of Origen, who visited him at his See, had held the Bishopric of Caesarea.
In the same age another saint, Gregory Thaumaturgus, a friend also and disciple
of Origen, was bishop of Neo-Caesarea in Pontus. During the same century, too,
no less than four other Gregories shed more or less lustre on bishoprics in
that country. The family of Gregory of Nyssa was one of considerable wealth
and distinction, and one also conspicuously Christian.
During the Diocletian persecution his grandparents had fled for safety to
the mountainous region of Pontus, where they endured great hardships and privations.
It is said that his maternal grandfather, whose name is unknown, eventually
lost both life and property. After a retirement of some few years the family
appear to have returned and settled at Caesarea in Cappadocia, or else at Neo-Caesarea
in Pontus, for there is some uncertainty in the account.
Gregory's father, Basil, who gave his name to his eldest son, was known as
a rhetorician. He died at a comparatively early age, leaving a family of ten
children, five of whom were boys and five girls, under the care of their grandmother
Macrina and mother Emmelia. Both of these illustrious ladies were distinguished
for the earnestness and strictness of their Christian principles, to which
the latter added the charm of great personal beauty.
All the sons and daughters appear to have been of high character, but it is
only of four sons and one daughter that we have any special record. The daughter,
called Macrina, from her grandmother, was the angel in the house of this illustrious
family. She shared with her grandmother and mother the care and education of
all its younger members. Nor was there one of them who did not owe to her religious
influence their settlement in the faith and consistency of Christian conduct.
This admirable woman had been betrothed in early life, but her intended husband
died of fever. She permitted herself to contract no other alliance, but regarded
herself as still united to her betrothed in the other world. She devoted herself
to a religious life, and eventually, with her mother Emmelia, established a
female conventual society on the family-property in Pontus, at a place called
Annesi, on the banks of the river Iris.
It was
owing to her persuasions that her brother Basil also gave up the worldly
life, and retired to lead
the devout life in a wild spot in the immediate neighbourhood.
of Annesi. Here for a while he was an hermit, and here he persuaded his friend
Gregory Nazianzen to join him. They studied together the works of Origen, and
published a selection of extracts from his Commentaries, which they called "Philocalia." By
the suggestions of a friend Basil enlarged his idea, and converted his hermit's
seclusion into a monastery, which eventually became the centre of many others
which sprung up in that district.
His inclination for the monastic life had been greatly influenced by his acquaintance
with the Egyptian monks, who had impressed him with the value of their system
as an aid to a life of religious devotion. He had visited also the hermit saints
of Syria and Arabia, and learnt from them the practice of a severe asceticism,
which both injured his health and shortened his days.
Gregory of Nyssa was the third son, and one of the youngest of the family.
He had an elder brother, Nectarius, who followed the profession of their father,
and became rhetorician, and like him died early. He had also a younger brother,
Peter, who became bishop of Sebaste.
Besides
the uncertainty as to the year and place of his birth it is not known where
he received his
education.
From the weakness of his health and delicacy
of his constitution, it was most probably at home. It is interesting, in the
case of one so highly educated, to know who, in consequence of his father's
early death, took charge of his merely intellectual bringing up: and his own
words do not leave us in any doubt that, so far as he had a teacher, it was
Basil, his senior by several years. He constantly speaks of him as the revered
'Master:' to take but one instance, he says in his Hexaemeron (ad init.) that
all that will be striking in that work will be due to Basil, what is inferior
will be the 'pupil's.' Even in the matter of style, he says in a letter written
in early life to Libanius that though he enjoyed his brother's society but
a short time yet Basil was the author of his oratory (<greek>loUou</greek>):
and it is safe to conclude that he was introduced to all that Athens had to
teach, perhaps even to medicine, by Basil: for Basil had been at Athens. On
the other hand we can have no difficulty in crediting his mother, of whom he
always spoke with the tenderest affection, and his admirable sister Macrina,
with the care of his religious teaching. Indeed few could be more fortunate
than Gregory in the influences of home. If, as there is every reason to believe,
the grandmother Macrina survived Gregory's early childhood, then, like Timothy,
he was blest with the religious instruction of another Lois and Eunice.
In this
chain of female relationship it is difficult to say which link is worthier
of note, grandmother,
mother,
or daughter. Of the first, Basil, who
attributes his early religious impressions to his grandmother, tells us that
as a child she taught him a Creed, which had been drawn up for the use of the
Church of Neo-Caesarea by Gregory Thaumaturgus. This Creed, it is said, was
revealed to the Saint in a vision. It has been translated by Bishop Bull in
his "Fidei Nicaenae Defensio." In its language and spirit it anticipates
the Creed of Constantinople.
Certain it is that Gregory had not the benefit of a residence at Athens, or
of foreign travel. It might have given him a strength of character and width
of experience, in which he was certainly deficient. His shy and retiring disposition
induced him to remain at home without choosing a profession, living on his
share of the paternal property, and educating himself by a discipline of his
own.
He remained for years unbaptized. And this is a very noticeable circumstance
which meets us in the lives of many eminent Saints and Bishops of the Church.
They either delayed baptism themselves, or it was delayed for them. Indeed
there are instances of Bishops baptized and consecrated the same day.
Gregory's first inclination or impulse to make a public profession of Christianity
is said to have been due to a remarkable dream or vision.
His mother Emmelia, at her retreat at Annesi, urgently entreated him to be
present and take part in a religious ceremony in honour of the Forty Christian
Martyrs. He had gone unwillingly, and wearied with his journey and the length
of the service, which lasted far into the night, he lay down and fell asleep
in the garden. He dreamed that the Martyrs appeared to him and, reproaching
him for his indifference, beat him with rods. On awaking he was filled with
remorse, and hastened to amend his past neglect by earnest entreaties for mercy
and forgiveness. Under the influence of the terror which his dream inspired
he consented to undertake the office of reader in the Church, which of course
implied a profession of Christianity. But some unfitness, and, perhaps, that
love of eloquence which clung to him to the last, soon led him to give up the
office, and adopt the profession of a rhetorician or advocate. For this desertion
of a sacred for a secular employment he is taken severely to task by his brother
Basil and his friend Gregory Nazianzen. The latter does not hesitate to charge
him with being influenced, not by conscientious scruples, but by vanity and
desire of public display, a charge not altogether consistent with his character.
Here it
is usual to place the marriage of Gregory with Theosebeia, said to have been
a sister of Gregory
Nazianzen.
Certainly the tradition of Gregory's
marriage received such credit as to be made in after times a proof of the non-celibacy
of the Bishops of his age. But it rests mainly on two passages, which taken
separately are not in the least conclusive. The first is the ninety-fifth letter
of Gregory Nazianzen, written to console for a certain loss by death, i.e.
of "Theosebeia, the fairest, the most lustrous even amidst such beauty
of the <greek>adelFoi</greek>; Theosebeia, the true priestess,
the yokefellow and the equal of a priest." J. Rupp has well pointed out
that the expression 'yokefellow ' (<greek>suzugon</greek>), which
has been insisted as meaning 'wife,' may, especially in the language of Gregory
Nazianzen, be equivalent to <greek>adelFos</greek>. He sees in
this Theosebeia 'a sister of the Cappadocian brothers.' The second passage
is contained in the third cap. of Gregory's treatise On Virginity. Gregory
there complains that he is "cut off by a kind of gulf from this glory
of virginity" (<greek>parqenia</greek>). The whole passage
should be consulted. Of course its significance depends on the meaning given
to <greek>parqenia</greek>. Rupp asserts that more and more towards
the end of the century this word acquired a technical meaning derived from
the purely ideal side, i.e. virginity of soul: and that Gregory is alluding
to the same thing that his friend had not long before blamed him for, the keeping
of a school for rhetoric, where his object had been merely worldly reputation,
and the truly ascetic career had been marred (at the time he wrote). Certainly
the terrible indictment of marriage in the third cap of this treatise comes
ill from one whose wife not only must have been still living, but possessed
the virtues sketched in the letter of Gregory Nazianzen: while the allusions
at the end of it to the law-courts and their revelations appear much more like
the professional reminiscence of a rhetorician who must have been familiar
with them, than the personal complaint of one who had cause to depreciate marriage.
The powerful words of Basil, de Virgin. I. 610, a. b., also favour the above
view of the meaning of <greek>Parqenia</greek>: and Gregory elsewhere
distinctly calls celibacy <greek>parqenia</greek> <greek>tou</greek> <greek>swmatos</greek>,
and regards it as a means only to this higher <greek>parqenia</greek> (III.
131). But the two passages above, when combined, may have led to the tradition
of Gregory's marriage. Nicephorus Callistus, for example, who first makes mention
of it, must have put upon <greek>parqenia</greek> the interpretation
of his own time (thirteenth century,) i.e. that of continence. Finally, those
who adopt this tradition have still to account for the fact that no allusion
to Theosebeia as his wife, and no letter to her, is to be found in Gregory's
numerous writings. It is noteworthy that the Benedictine editors of Gregory
Nazianzen (ad Epist. 95) also take the above view.
His final recovery and conversion to the Faith, of which he was always after
so strenuous an asserter, was due to her who, all things considered, was the
master spirit of the family. By the powerful persuasions of his sister Macrina,
at length, after much struggle, he altered entirely his way of life, severed
himself from all secular occupations, and retired to his brother's monastery
in the solitudes of Pontus, a beautiful spot, and where, as we have seen, his
mother and sister had established, in the immediate neighbourhood, a similar
association for women.
Here,
then, Gregory was settled for several years, and devoted himself to the study
of the Scripture
and
the works of his master Origen. Here, too, his
love of natural scenery was deepened so as to find afterwards constant and
adequate expression. For in his writings we have in large measure that sentiment
of delight in the beauty of nature of which, even when it was felt, the traces
are so few and far between in the whole range of Greek literature. A notable
instance is the following from the Letter to Adelphus, written long afterwards:
-"The gifts bestowed upon the spot by Nature, who beautifies the earth
with an impromptu grace, are such as these: below, the river Halys makes the
place fair to look upon with his banks, and glides like a golden ribbon through
their deep purple, reddening his current with the soil he washes down. Above,
a mountain densely overgrown with wood stretches, with its long ridge, covered
at all points with the foliage of oaks, more worthy of finding some Homer to
sing its praises than that Ithacan Neritus which the poet calls 'far-seen with
quivering leaves.' But the natural growth of wood as it comes down the hill-side
meets at the foot the plantations of human husbandry. For forthwith vines,
spread out over the slopes and swellings and hollows at the mountain's base,
cover with their colour, like a green mantle, all the lower ground: and the
season also was now adding to their beauty with a display of magnificent grape-clusters." Another
is from the treatise On Infants' Early Deaths: -- "Nay look only at an
ear of corn, at the germinating of some plant, at a ripe bunch of grapes, at
the beauty of early autumn whether in fruit or flower, at the grass springing
unbidden, at the mountain reaching up with its summit to the height of the
ether, at the springs of the lower ground bursting from its flanks in streams
like milk, and running in rivers through the glens, at the sea receiving those
streams from every direction and yet remaining within its limits with waves
edged by the stretches of beach, and never stepping beyond those fixed boundaries:
and how can the eye of reason fail to find in them all that our education for
Realities requires?" The treatise On Virginity was the fruit of this life
in Basil's monastery.
Henceforward the fortunes of Gregory are more closely linked with those of
his great brother Basil.
About A. D. 365 Basil was summoned from his retirement to act as coadjutor
to Euseblus, the Metropolitan of Caesarea in Cappadocia, and aid him in repelling
the assaults of the Arian faction on the Faith. In these assaults the Arians
were greatly encouraged and assisted by the proclivities of the Emperor Valens.
After some few years of strenuous and successful resistance, and the endurance
of great persecution from the Emperor and his Court, a persecution which indeed
pursued him through life, Basil is called by the popular voice, on the death
of Eusebius, A. D. 370, to succeed him in the See. His election is vehemently
opposed, but after much turmoil is at length accomplished.
To strengthen himself in his position, and surround himself with defenders
of the orthodox Faith, he obliges his brother Gregory, in spite of his emphatic
protest, to undertake the Bishopric of Nyssa (1), a small town in the west
of Cappadocia. When a friend expressed his surprise that he had chosen so obscure
a place for such a man as Gregory, he replied, that
A SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF S. GREGORY OF NYSSA.
He did not desire his brother to receive distinction from the name of his
See, but rather to confer distinction upon it.
It was with the same feeling, and by the exercise of a like masterful will,
that he forced upon his friend Gregory Nazianzen the Bishopric of a still more
obscure and unimportant place, called Sasima. But Gregory highly resented the
nomination, which unhappily led to a lifelong estrangement.
It was about this time, too, that a quarrel had arisen between Basil and their
uncle, another Gregory, one of the Cappadocian Bishops. And here Gregory of
Nyssa gave a striking proof of the extreme simplicity and unreflectiveness
of his character, which without guileful intent yet led him into guile. Without
sufficient consideration he was induced to practise a deceit which was as irreconcileable
with Christian principle as with common sense. In his endeavours to set his
brother and uncle at one, when previous efforts had been in vain, he had recourse
to an extraordinary method. He forged a letter, as if from their uncle, to
Basil, earnestly entreating reconciliation. The inevitable discovery of course
only widened the breach, and drew down on Gregory his brother's indignant condemnation,
The reconciliation, however, which Gregory hoped for, was afterwards brought
about.
Nor was this the only occasion on which Gregory needed Basil's advice and
reproof, and protection from the consequences of his inexperienced zeal. After
he had become Bishop of Nyssa, with a view to render assistance to his brother
he promoted the summoning of Synods. But Basil's wider experience told him
that no good would come of such assemblies under existing circumstances. Besides
which he had reason to believe that Gregory would be made the tool of factious
and designing men. He therefore discouraged the attempt. At another time Basil
had to interpose his authority to prevent his brother joining in a mission
to Rome to invite the interference of Pope Damasus and the Western Bishops
in the settlement of the troubles at Antioch in consequence of the disputed
election to the See. Basil had himself experience of the futility of such application
to Rome, from the want of sympathy in the Pope and the Western Bishops with
the troubles in the East. Nor would he, by such application, give a handle
for Rome's assertion of supremacy, and encroachment on the independence of
the Eastern Church. The Bishopric of Nyssa was indeed to Gregory no bed of
roses. Sad was the contrast to one of his genre spirit, more fitted for studious
retirement and monastic calm than for controversies which did not end with
the pen, between the peaceful leisure of his retreat in Pontus and the troubles
and antagonisms of his present position. The enthusiasm of his faith on the
subject of the Trinity and the Incarnation brought upon him the full weight
of Arian and Sabellian hostility, aggravated as it was by the patronage of
the Emperor. In fact his whole life at Nyssa was a series of persecutions.
A charge of uncanonical irregularity in his ordination is brought up against
him by certain Arian Bishops, and he is summoned to appear and answer them
at a Synod at Ancyra. To this was added the vexation of a prosecution by Demosthenes,
the Emperor's chef de cuisine, on a charge of defalcation in the Church funds.
A band of soldiers is sent to fetch him to the Synod. The fatigue of the journey,
and the rough treatment of his conductors, together with anxiety of mind, produce
a fever which prevents his attendance. His brother Basil comes to his assistance.
He summons another Synod of orthodox Cappadocian Bishops, who dictate in their
joint names a courteous letter, apologising for Gregory's absence from the
Synod of Ancyra, and proving the falsehood of the charge of embezzlement. At
the same time he writes to solicit the interest of Astorgus, a person of considerable
influence at the Court, to save his brother from the indignity of being dragged
before a secular tribunal.
Apparently the application was unsuccessful. Demosthenes now obtains the holding
another Synod at Gregory's own See of Nyssa, where he is summoned to answer
the same charges. Gregory refuses to attend. He is consequently pronounced
contumacious, and deposed from his Bishopric. His deposition is followed immediately
by a decree of banishment from the Emperor, A.D. 376. He retires to Seleucia.
But his banishment did not secure him from the malice and persecution of his
enemies. He is obliged frequently to shift his quarters, and is subjected to
much bodily discomfort and suffering. From the consoling answers of his friend
Gregory of Nazianzen (for his own letters are lost), we learn the crushing
effects of all these troubles upon his gentle and sensitive spirit, and the
deep despondency into which he had fallen.
At length there is a happier turn of affairs. The Emperor Valens is killed,
A.D. 378, and with him Arianism ' vanished in the crash of Hadrianople.' He
is succeeded by Gratian, the friend and disciple of St. Ambrose. The banished
orthodox Bishops are restored to their Sees, and Gregory returns to Nyssa.
In (2) one of his letters, most probably to his brother Basil, he gives a graphic
description of the popular triumph with which his return was greeted.
But the joy of his restoration is overshadowed by domestic sorrows. His great
brother, to whom he owed so much, soon after dies, ere he is 50 years of age,
worn out by his unparalleled toils and the severity of his ascetic life. Gregory
celebrated his death in a sincere panegyric. Its high-flown style is explained
by the rhetorical fashion of the time. The same year another sorrow awaits
him. After a separation of many years he revisits his sister Macrina, at her
convent in Pontus, but only to find her on her death-bed. We have an interesting
and graphic account of the scene between Gregory and his dying sister. To the
last this admirable woman appears as the great teacher of her family. She supplies
her brother with arguments for, and confirms his faith in, the resurrection
of the dead; and almost reproves him for the distress he felt at her departure,
bidding him, with St. Paul, not to sorrow as those who had no hope. After her
decease an inmate of the convent, named Vestiana, brought to Gregory a ring,
in which was a piece of the true Cross, and an iron cross, both of which were
found on the body when laying it out. One Gregory retained himself, the other
he gave to Vestiana. He buried his sister in the chapel at Annesi, in which
her parents and her brother Naucratius slept.
From henceforth the labours of Gregory have a far more extended range. He
steps into the place vacated by the death of Basil, and takes foremost rank
among the defenders of the Faith of Nicaea. He is not, however, without trouble
still from the heretical party. Certain Galatians had been busy in sowing the
seeds of their heresy among his own people. He is subjected, too, to great
annoyance from the disturbances which arose out of the wish of the people of
Ibera in Pontus to have him as their Bishop. In that early age of the Church
election to a Bishopric, if not dependent on the popular voice, at least called
forth the expression of much popular feeling, like a contested election amongst
ourselves. This often led to breaches of the peace, which required military
intervention to suppress them, as it appears to have done on this occasion.
But the reputation of Gregory is now so advanced, and the weight of his authority
as an eminent teacher so generally acknowledged, that we find him as one of
the Prelates at the Synod of Antioch assembled for the purpose of healing the
long-continued schisms in that distracted See. By the same Synod Gregory is
chosen to visit and endeavour to reform the Churches of Arabia and Babylon,
which had fallen into a very corrupt and degraded state. He gives a lamentable
account of their condition, as being beyond all his powers of reformation.
On this same journey he visits Jerusalem and its sacred scenes: it has been
conjectured that the Apollinarian heresy drew him thither. Of the Church of
Jerusalem he can give no better account than of those he had already visited.
He expresses himself as greatly scandalized at the conduct of the Pilgrims
who visited the Holy City on the plea of religion. Writing to three ladies,
whom he had known at Jerusalem, he takes occasion, from what he had witnessed
there, to speak of the uselessness of pilgrimages as any aids to reverence
and faith, and denounces in the strongest terms the moral dangers to which
all pilgrims, especially women, are exposed.
This letter is so condemnatory of what was a common and authorized practice
of the medival Church that (3) Divines of the Latin communion have eudeavoured,
but in vain, to deny its authenticity.
The name and character of Gregory had now reached the Imperial Court, where
Theo-dosius had lately succeeded to the Eastern Empire. As a proof of the esteem
in which he was then held, it is said that in his recent journey to Babylon
and the Holy Land he travelled with carriages provided for him by the Emperor.
Still greater distinction awaits him. He is one of the hundred and fifty Bishops
summoned by Theodosius to the second (Ecumenical Council, that of Constantinople,
A.D. 381. To the assembled Fathers he brings an (4) instalment of his treatise
against the Eunomian heresy, which he had written in defence of his brother
Basil's positions, on the subject of the Trinity and the Incarnation. This
he first read to his friend Gregory Nazianzen, Jerome, and others. Such was
the influence he exercised in the Council that it is said, though this is very
doubtful, that the explanatory clauses added to the Nicene Creed are due to
him. Certain, however, it is that he delivered the inaugural address, which
is not extant; further that he preached the funeral oration, which has been
preserved, on the death of Meletius, of Antioch, the first President of the
Council, who died at Constantinople; also that he preached at the enthronement
of Gregory Nazianzen in the capital. This oration has perished.
Shortly before the close of the Council, by a Constitution of the Emperor,
issued from Heraclea, Gregory is nominated as one of the Bishops who were to
be regarded as the central authorities of Catholic Communion. In other words,
the primacy of Rome or Alexandria in the East was to be replaced by that of
other Sees, especially Constantinople. Helladius of Csarea was to be Gregory's
colleague in his province. The connexion led to a misunderstanding. As to the
grounds of this there is much uncertainty. The account of it is entirely derived
from Gregory himself in his fetter to Flavian, and from his great namesake.
Possibly there were faults on both sides.
We do not read of Gregory being at the Synod, A.D. 382, which followed the
great Council of Constantinople. But we find him present at the Synod held
the following year.
This same year we have proof of the continued esteem and favour shown him
by the Imperial Court. He is chosen to pronounce the funeral oration on the
infant Princess Palcheria. And not long after that also on the death of the
Empress Flaccilla, or Placidia, herself. This last was a magnificent eulogy,
but one, according to Tillemont, even surpassed by that of Theodoret. This
admirable and holy woman, a saint of the Eastern Church, fully warranted all
the praise that could be bestowed upon her. If her husband Theodosius did not
owe his conversion to Christianity to her example and influence, he certainly
did his adherence to the true Faith. It is one of the subjects of Gregory's
praise of her that by her persuasion the Emperor refused to give an interview
to the 'rationalist of the fourth century,' Eunomius.
Scarcely
anything is known of the latter years of Gregory of Nyssa's life. The last
record we have of
him is
that he was present at a Synod of Constantinople,
summoned A.D. 394, by Rufinus, the powerful prfect of the East, under the presidency
of Nectarius. The rival claims to the See of Bostra in Arabia had to be then
settled; but perhaps the chief reason for summoning this assembly was to glorify
the consecration of Rufinus' new Church in the suburbs. It was there that Gregory
delivered the sermon which was probably his last, wrongly entitled 'On his
Ordination.' His words, which heighten the effect of others then preached,
are humbly compared to the blue circles painted on the new walls as a foil
to the gilded dome above. "The whole breathes a calmer and more peaceful
spirit; the deep sorrow over heretics who forfeit the blessings of the Spirit
changes only here and there into the flashes of a short-lived indignation." (J.
Rupp.)
The prophecy
of Basil had come true. Nyssa was ennobled by the name of its bishop appearing
on
the roll
of this Synod, between those of the Metropolitans
of Csarea and Iconium. Even in outward rank he is equal to the highest. The
character of Gregory could not be more justly drawn than in the words of Tillemont
(IX. p. 269). "Autant en effet, qu'on pent juger de lui par ses ecrits,
c'etoit un esprit doux, bon, facile, qui avec beaucoup d'elevation et de lumiere,
avoit neanmois beaucoup de simplicite et de candent, qui aimoit plus le repos
que l'action, et le travail du cabinet que le tumulte des affaires, qui avec
cela etoit sans faste, dispose a estimer et a loner los autres et a se mettre
a dessons d'eux. Mais quoiqu' il ne cher-chat que le repos, nous avons vu que
son zele pour sos freres l'avoit souvent engagee a de grands travaux, et que
Dieu avait honore sa simplicite en le faisant regarder comme le maitre, le
docteur, le pacificateur et l'arbitre des eglises."
His death (probably 395) is commemorated by the Greek Church on January 10,
by the Latin on March (9).
CHAPTER II.
HIS GENERAL CHARACTER AS A THEOLOGIAN.
"THE first who sought to establish by rational considerations the whole
complex of orthodox doctrines." So Ueberweg (History of Philosophy, p.
326) of Gregory of Nyssa. This marks the transition from ante-Nicene times.
Then, at all events in the hands of Origen, philosophy was identical with theology.
Now, that there is a 'complex of orthodox doctrines' to defend, philosophy
becomes the handmaid of theology. Gregory, in this respect, has done the most
important service of any of the writers of the Church in the fourth century.
He treats each single philosophical view only as a help to grasp the formul
of faith; and the truth of that view consists with him only in its adaptability
to that end. Notwithstanding strong speculative leanings he does not defend
orthodoxy either in the fashion of the Alexandrian school or in the fashion
of some in modern times, who put forth a system of philosophy to which the
dogmas of the Faith are to be accommodated.
If this
be true, the question as to his attitude towards Plato, which is one of the
first that suggests
itself,
is settled. Against polytheism he does indeed
seek to defend Christianity by connecting it apologetically with Plato's system.
This we cannot be surprised at, considering that the definitions of the doctrines
of the Catholic Church were formed in the very place where the last considerable
effort of Platonism was made; but he by no means makes the New Life in any
way dependent on this system of philosophy. "We cannot speculate," he
says (De Anim. et Resurrect.) .... "we must leave the Platonic car." But
still when he is convinced that Plato will confirm doctrine he will, even in
polemic treatises, adopt his view; for instance, he seeks to grasp the truth
of the Trinity from the Platonic account of our internal consciousness, i.e. <greek>yukh</greek>. <greek>loUos</greek>, <greek>nous</greek>;
because such a proof from consciousness is, to Gregory, the surest and most
reliable.
The "rational considerations," then, by which Gregory would have
established Christian doctrine are not necessarily drawn from the philosophy
of the time: nor, further, does he seek to rationalize entirely all religious
truth. In fact he resigns the hope of comprehending the Incarnation and all
the great articles. This is the very thing that distinguishes the Catholic
from the Eunomian. "Receiving the fact we leave untampered with the manner
of the creation of the Universe, as altogether secret and inexplicable (1." With
a turn resembling the view of Tertullian, he comes back to the conclusion that
for us after all Religious Truth consists in mystery. "The Church possesses
the means of demonstrating these things: or rather, she has faith, which is
surer than demonstration (1)." He developes the truth of the Resurrection
as much by the fulfilment of God's promises as by metaphysics: and it has been
considered as one of the proofs that the treatise What is being 'in the image
of Gad'? is not his that this subordination of philosophical proof to the witness
of the Holy Spirit is not preserved in it.
Nevertheless there was a large field, larger even than in the next century,
in which rationalizing was not only allowable, but was even required of him.
In this there are three questions which Gregory has treated with particular
fulness and originality. They are:--
1. Evil;
2. The relation between the ideal and the actual Man;
3. Spirit.
1. He takes, to begin with, Origen's view of evil. Virtue and Vice are not
opposed to each other as two Existencies: but as Being is opposed to not-Being.
Vice exists only as an absence. But how did this arise?
In answering this question he seems sometimes to come very near Manicheism,
and his writings must be read very carefully, in order to avoid fixing upon
him the groundless charge that he leaves evil in too near connexion with Matter.
But the passages (2) which give rise to this charge consist of comparisons
found in his homilies and meditations; just as a modern theologian might in
such works make the Devil the same as Sin and Death. The only imperfection
in his view is that he is unable (3) to regard evil as not only suffered but
even permitted by God. But this imperfection is inseparable from his time:
for Manicheism was too near and its opposition too little overcome for such
a view to be possible for him; he could not see that it is the only one able
thoroughly to resist Dualism.
Evil with
Gregory is to be found in the spontaneous proclivity of the soul towards
Matter: but not
in Matter
itself. Matter, therefore, in his eschatology
is not to be burnt up and annihilated: only soul and body have to be refined,
as gold (this is a striking comparison) is refined. He is very clear upon the
relations between the three factors, body, matter, and evil. He represents
the mind as the mirror of the Archetypal Beauty: then below the mind comes
body (<greek>fusis</greek>) which is connected with mind and pervaded
by it, and when thus trans-figured and beautified by it becomes itself the
mirror of this mirror: and then this body in its turn influences and combines
Matter. The Beauty of the Supreme Being thus penetrates all things: and as
long as the lower holds on to the higher all is well. But if a rupture occurs
anywhere, then Matter, receiving no longer influence from above, reveals its
own deformity, and imparts something of it to body and, through that, to mind:
for matter is in itself 'a shapeless unorganized thing (4).' Thus the mind
loses the image of God. But evil began when the rupture was made: and what
caused that? When and how did the mind become separated from God?
Gregory answers this question by laying it down as a principle, that everything
created is subject to change. The Uncreate Being is changeless, but Creation,
since its very beginning was owing to a change, i.e. a calling of the non-existent
into existence, is liable to alter. Gregory deals here with angelic equally
as with human nature, and with all the powers in both, especially with the
will, whose virtual freedom he assumes throughout. That, too, was created;
therefore that, too, could change.
It was possible, therefore, that, first, one of the created spirits, and,
as it actually happened, he who was entrusted with the supervision of the earth,
should choose to turn his eyes away from the Good; he thus looked at a lower
good; and so began to be envious and to have... All evil followed in a chain
from this beginning; according to the principle that the beginning of anything
is the cause of all that follows in its train.
So the
Devil fell: and the proclivity to evil was introduced into the spiritual
world. Man, however,
still looked
to God and was filled with blessings (this
is the 'ideal man' of Gregory). But as when the flame has got hold of a wick
one cannot dim its light by means of the flame itself, but only by mixing water
with the oil in the wick, so the Enemy effected the weakening of God's blessings
in man by cunningly mixing wickedness in his will, as he had mixed it in his
own. From first to last, then, evil lies in the <greek>proairesis</greek> and
in nothing else.
God knew
what would happen and suffered it, that He might not destroy our freedom,
the inalienable heritage
of reason and therefore a portion of His
image in us. 'He' gave scope to evil for a nobler end.' Gregory calls it a
piece of "little mindedness" to argue from evil either the weakness
or the wickedness of God.
II. His
remarks on the relation between the ideal and the actual Man are very interesting.
It is
usual with
the other Fathers, in speaking of man's original
perfection, to take the moment of the first man's residence in Paradise, and
to regard the whole of human nature as there represented by the first two human
beings. Gregory is far removed from this way of looking at the matter. With
him human perfection is the 'idea' of humanity: he sees already in the bodily-created
Adam the fallen man. The present man is not to be distinguished from that bodily
Adam; both fall below the ideal type. Gregory seems to put the Fall beyond
and before the beginning of history. 'Under the form of narrative Moses places
before us mere doctrine (2).' The locus classicus about the idea and the reality
of human nature is On the Making of Man, I. p. 88 f. He sketches both in a
masterly way. He speaks of the division of the human race into male and female
as a 'device' (<greek>epiteknhsis</greek>), implying that it was
not the first 'organization' (<greek>kataskeuh</greek>). He hints
that the irrational element was actually provided by the Creator, Who foresaw
the Fall and the Redemption, for man to sin in; as if man immediately upon
the creation of the perfect humanity became a mixed nature (spirit and flesh),
and his fall was not a mere accident, but a necessary conseguence of this mixed
nature. Adam must have fallen: there was no perfect humanity in Paradise. In
man's mixed nature of spirit and flesh nutrition is the basis of his sensation,
and sensation is the basis of his thought; and so it was inevitable that sin
through this lower yet vital side of man should enter in. So ingrained is the
spirit with the flesh in the whole history of actual humanity that all the
varieties of all the souls that ever have lived or ever shall, arise from this
very mixture; i.e. from the varying degrees of either factor in each. But as
Gregory's view here touches, though in striking contrast, on Origen's, more
will be said about it in the next chapter.
It follows
from this that Gregory, as Clement and Basil before him, did not look upon
Original Sin
as the accidental
or extraordinary thing which it was
afterwards regarded. 'From a man who is a sinner and subject to passion of
course is engendered a man who is a sinner and subject to passion: sin being
in a manner born with him, and growing with his growth, and not dying with
it.' And yet he says elsewhere, "An infant who is just born is not culpable,
nor does it merit punishment; just as he who has been baptized has no account
to give of his past sins, since they are forgiven;" and he calls infants <greek>aponhroi</greek>,
'not having in the least admitted the disease into their soul.' But these two
views can of course be reconciled; the infant at the moment of its physical
birth starts with sins forgotten, just as at the moment of its spiritual birth
it starts with sins forgiven. No actual sin has been committed. But then its
nature has lost the <greek>apaqeia</greek>; the inevitable weakness
of its ancestry is in it.
Ill. 'Spirit.' Speaking of the soul, Gregory asks, 'How can that which is
incomposite be dissolved?' i.e. the soul is spirit, and spirit is incomposite
and therefore indestructible.
But care must be taken not to infer too much from this his favourite expression
'spirit' in connexion with the soul. 'God is spirit' too; and we are inclined
to forget that this is no more than a negative definition, and to imagine the
human spirit of equal prerogative with Deity. Gregory gives no encouragement
to this; he distinctly teaches that, though the soul is incomposite, it is
not in the least independent of time and space, as the Deity is.
In fact he almost entirely drops the old Platonic division of the Universe
into Intelligible (spiritual) and Sensible, which helps to keep up this confusion
between human and divine
'spirit,' and adopts the Christian division of Creator and Created.This difference
between Creator and Created is further figured by him as that between
1. The Infinite.The Finite.
2. The Changeless.The Changeable.
3. The Contradiction-less.The Contradictory.
The result of this is that the Spirit-world itself has been divided into Uncreate
and Created.
With regard,
then, to this created Spirit-world we find that Gregory, as Basil, teaches
that it
existed, i.e.
it had been created, before the work of the Six
Days began. 'God made all that is, at once' (<greek>aqrows</greek>).
This is only his translation of the verse, 'In the beginning God created the
heaven and the earth;' the material for 'heaven' and 'earth,' i.e. spirits
and chaos, was made in a moment, but God had not yet spoken the successive
Words of creation. The souls of men, then, existed from the very beginning
of creation, and in a determinate number; for this is a necessary consequence
of the 'simultaneous creation.' This was the case with the Angels too, the
other portion of the created Spirit-world. Gregory has treated the subject
of the Angels very fully. He considers that they are perfect: but their perfection
too is contingent: it depends on the grace of God and their own wills; the
angels are free, and therefore changeable. Their will necessarily moves towards
something: at their first creation the Beautiful alone solicited them. Man
'a little lower than the Angels' was perfect too; deathless, passionless, contemplative.
'The true and perfect soul is single in its nature, intellectual, immaterial
(1).' He was 'as the Angels' and if he fell, Lucifer fell too. Gregory will
not say, as Origen did, that human souls had a body when first created: rather,
as we have seen, he implies the contrary; and he came to be considered the
champion that fought the doctrine of the pre-existence of embodied souls. He
seems to have been influenced by Methodius' objections to Origen's view. But
his magnificent idea of the first man gives way at once to something more Scriptural
and at the same time more scientific; and his ideal becomes a downright forecast
of Realism.
Taking,
however, the human soul as it is, he still continues, we often find, to compare
it with God.
In his
great treatise On the Soul and the Resurrection,
he rests a great deal on the parallel between the relation of man to his body,
and that of God to the world.--'The soul is as a cord drawn out of mud; God
draws to Himself what is His own.'-He calls the human spirit 'an influx of
the divine in-breathing' (Adv. Apolim. c. 12). Anger and desire do not belong
to the essence of the soul, he says: they are only among its varying states.
The soul, then, as separable from matter, is like God. But this likeness does
not extend to the point of identity. Incomprehensible, immortal, it is not
uncreated. The distinction between the Creator and the Created cannot be obliterated.
The attributes Of the Creator set down above, i.e. that He is infinite, changeless,
contradictionless, and so always good, &c., can be applied only catachrestically
to some men, in that they resemble their Maker as a copy resembles its original:
but still, in this connexion, Gregory does speak of those 'who do not need
any cleansing at all (2),' and the context forces us to apply these words to
men. There is no irony, to him or to any Father of the fourth century, in the
words, 'They that are whole need not a physician.' Although in the treatise
On Virginity, where he is describing the development of his own moral and religious
life, he is very far from applying them to himself, he nevertheless seems to
recognize the fact that since Christianity began there are those to whom they
might apply.
There is also need of a certain amount of 'rational considerations' in advancing
a Defence and a Theory of Christianity. He makes this according to the special
requirements of the time in his Oratio Catechelica. His reasonings do not seem
to us always convincing; but the presence of a living Hellenism and Judaism
in the world required them. These two phnomena also explain what appears to
us a great weakness in this work: namely, that he treats Hellenism as if it
were all speculation; Judaism as if it were all facts. These two religions
were too near and too practically opposed to each other for him to see, as
we can now, by the aid of a sort of science of religions, that every religion
has its idea, and every religion has its facts. He and all the first Apologists,
with the spectacle of these two apparently opposite systems before them, thought
that, in arriving at the True Religion as well, all could be done by considering
facts; or all could be done by Gregory chose the latter method. A Dogmatic
in the modern sense, in which both the idea and the facts of Christianity flow
into one, could not have been expected of him. The Oratio Catethetica is a
mere philosophy of Christianity in detail written in the philosophic language
of the time. Not only does he refrain from using the historic proofs, i.e.
of prophecy and type (except very sparingly and only to meet an adversary),
but his defence is insufficient from another point of view also; he hardly
uses the moral proofs either; he wanders persistently in metaphysics.
If he
does not lean enough on these two classes of proofs, at all events that he
does not lean entirely
on either,
may be considered as a guarantee of his
excellence as a theologian pure and simple. But he is on the other hand very
far from attempting a philosophic construction of Christianity, as we have
seen. Though akin to modern theologians in many things, he is unlike those
of them who would construct an a priori Christianity, in which the relationship
of one part to another is so close that all stands or falls together. Philosophic
deduction is with him only 'a kind of instruction' used in his apologetic works.
On occasion he shows a clear perception of the historic principle. "The
supernatural character of the Gospel miracles bears witness to their divine
origin (1)." He points, as Origen did, to the continued possession of
miraculous powers in the Church. Again, as regards moral proof, there had been
so much attempted that way by the Neo-Platonists that such proof could not
have exactly the same degree of weight attributed to it that it has now, at
least by an adherent of the newer Hellenism. Philostratus, Porphyry, Iamblichus
had all tried to attract attention to the holy lives of heathen sages. Yet
to these, rough sketches as they were, the Christian did oppose the Lives of
the Saints: notably Gregory himself in the... of Gregory Thaumaturgus: as Origen
before him (c. Celsum, passim) had shewn in detail the difference in kind of
Christian holiness.
His treatment of the Sacraments in the Oratio Catechetica is noteworthy. On
Baptism he is very complete: it will be sufficient to notice here the peculiar
proof he offers that the Holy Spirit is actually given in Baptism. It is the
same proof, to start with, as that which establishes that God came in the flesh
when Christ came. Miracles prove this; (he is not wanting here in the sense
of the importance of History). If, then, we are persuaded that God is here,
we must allow also that truth is here: for truth is the mark of Deity. When,
therefore, God has said that He will come in a particular way, if called in
a particular way, this must be true. He is so called in Baptism: therefore
He comes. (The vital importance of the doctrine of the Trinity, upon which
Gregory laboured for so many years, thus all comes from Baptism.) Gregory would
not confine the entire force of Baptism to the one ritual act. A resurrection
to a new immortal life is begun in Baptism, but owing to the weakness of nature
this complete effect is separated into stages or parts. With regard to the
necessity of Baptism for salvation, he says he does not know if the Angels
receive the souls of the unbaptized; but he rather intimates that they wander
in the air seeking rest, and entreat in vain like the Rich Man. To him who
wilfully defers it he says, 'You are out of paradise, O Catechumen!'
In treating the Sacrament of the Eucharist, Gregory was the first Father who
developed the view of transformation, for which transubstantiation was afterwards
substituted to suit the mediaeval philosophy; that is, he put this view already
latent into actual words. There is a locus classicus in the Oratio Catechetica,
c. 37.
"Therefore from the same cause as that by which the bread that was transformed
in that Body was changed to a divine potency, a similar result takes place
now. For as in that case, too, the grace of the Word used to make holy the
Body, the substance of which came of the bread and was in a manner itself bread,
so also in this case the bread, as says the Apostle, ' is sanctified by the
word of God and prayer:' not that it advances by the process of eating to the
stage of passing into the body of the Word, but it at once is changed into
the Body, by the Word, as the Word Himself said, ' This is My Body;'" and
just above he had said: "Rightly do we believe that now also the bread
which is consecrated by the word of God is changed into the body of God the
Word." This way of explaining the mystery of the Sacrament, i.e. from
the way bread was changed into the Word when Christ was upon earth, is compared
by Neander with another way Gregory had of explaining it, i.e. the heightened
efficacy of the bread is as the heightened efficacy of the baptismal water,
the anointing oil (1), &c., a totally different idea. But this, which may
be called the metabatic view, is the one evidently most present to his mind.
In a fragment of his found in a Parisian MS. (2), quoted with the Liturgies
of James, Basil, Chrysostom, we also find it; "The consecrated bread is
changed into the body of the Word; and it is needful for humanity to partake
of that."
Again,
the necessity of the Incarnation, drawn from the words "it was
necessary that Christ should suffer," receives a rational treatment from
him. There must ever be, from a meditation on this, two results, according
as the physical or the ethical element in Christianity prevails, i.e. 1. Propitiation;
2. Redemption. The first theory is dear to minds fed upon the doctrines of
the Reformation, but it receives no countenance from Gregory. Only in the book
in which Moses' Life is treated allegorically does he even mention it. The
sacrifice of Christ instead of the bloody sacrifices of the Old Testament is
not his doctrine, He develops his theory of the Redemption or Ransom (i.e.
from the Devil), in the Oratio Catechetica. Strict justice to the Evil One
required it. But in his hands this view never degenerates, as with some, into
a mere battle, e.g. in Gethsemane, between the Rescuer and Enslaver.
So much
has been said about Gregory's inconsistencies, and his apparent inconsistencies
are indeed
so many, that
some attempt must be made to explain this feature,
to some so repulsive, in his works. One instance at all events can show how
it is possible to reconcile even the most glaring. He is not a one-sided theologian:
he is not one of those who pass always the same judgment upon the same subject,
no matter with whom he has to deal. There could not be a harsher contradiction
than that between his statement about human generation in the Oratio Catechetica,
and that made in the treatises On Virginity and On the Making of Man. In the
O. C. everything hateful and undignified is removed from the idea of our birth;
the idea of <greek>paqos</greek> is not applied; "only evil
brings disgrace." But in the other two Treatises he represents generation
as a consequence of the Fall. This contradiction arises simply from the different
standpoint in each. In the one case he is apologetic; and so he adopts a universally
recognised moral axiom. In the other he is the Christian theologian; the natural
process, therefore, takes its colouring from the Christian doctrine of the
Fall. This is the standpoint of most of his works, which are polemical, not
apologetic. But in the treatise On the Saul and the Resurrection he introduces
even a third view about generation, which might be called that of the Christian
theosophist; i.e. generation is the means in the Divine plan for carrying Humanity
to its completion. Very similar is the view in the treatise On Infants' Early
Deaths; "the design of all births is that the Power which is above the
universe may in all parts of the creation be glorified by means of intellectual
natures conspiring to the same end, by virtue of the same faculty operating
in all; I mean, that of looking upon God." Here he is speaking to the
purely philosophic instinct. It may be remarked that On this and all the operations
of Divine foreknowledge in vast world-wide relations he has constantly striking
passages, and deserves for this especially to be studied.
The style
of Gregory is much more elegant than that of Basil: sometimes it may be called
eloquent.
His occasional
digressions did not strike ancient critics
as a fault. To them he is "sweet," "bright," "dropping
pleasure into the ears." But his love for splendour, combined with the
lateness of his Greek, make him one of the more difficult Church writers to
interpret accurately.
His similes and illustrations are very numerous, and well chosen. A few exceptions
must, perhaps, be made. He compares the mere professing Christian to the ape,
dressed like a mart and dancing to the flute, who used to amuse the people
in the theatre at Alexandria, but once revealed during the performance its
bestial nature, at the sight of food. This is hardly worthy of a great writer,
as Gregory was (1). Especially happy are his comparisons in the treatise On
the Saul and Resurrection, by which metaphysical truths are expressed; and
elsewhere those by which he seeks to reach the due proportions of the truth
of the Incarnation. The chapters in his work against Eunomius where he attempts
to depict the Infinite, are striking. But what commends him most to modern
taste is his power of description when dealing with facts, situations, persons:
he touches these always with a colour which is felt to be no exaggeration,
but the truth.
CHAPTER III.
HIS ORIGENISM.
A TRUE estimate of the position and value of Gregory as a Church teacher cannot
be formed until the question of his ' Origenism,' its causes and its quality,
is cleared up. It is well known that this charge began to be brought against
his orthodoxy at all events after the time of Justinian: nor could Germanus,
the Patriarch of Constantinople in the next century, remove it by the device
of supposed interpolations of partizans in the interests of the Eastern as
against the Western Church: for such a theory, to be true, would still require
some hints at all events in this Father to give a colour to such interpolations.
Moreover, as will be seen, the points in which Gregory is most like OriOn are
portions of the very groundwork of his own theology. The question, then, remains
why, and how far, is he a follower of Origen?
I. When we consider the character of his great forerunner, and the kind of
task which Gregory himself undertook, the first part of this question is easily
answered. When Christian doctrine had to be set forth philosophically, so as
to be intelligible to any cultivated mind of that time (to reconcile Greek
philosophy with Christian doctrine was a task which Gregory never dreamed of
attempting), the example and leader in such an attempt was Origen; he occupied
as it were the whole horizon. He was the founder of theology; the very vocabulary
of it, which is in use now, is of his devising. So that Gregory's language
must have had, necessarily, a close connexion with that of the great interpreter
and apologist, who had explained to his century the same truths which Gregory
had to explain to his: this must have been the case even if his mind had not
been as spiritual and idealizing as Origen's. But in some respects it will
be seen Gregory is even more an idealist than Origen himself. Alike, then,
from purpose and tradition as from sympathy he would look back to Origen. Though
a guIf was between them, and, since the Council of Nicaea, there were some
things that could come no more into controversy, Gregory saw, where the Church
had not spoken, with the same eyes as Origen: he uses the same keys as he did
for the problems which Scripture has not solved; he uses the same great weapon
of allegory in making the letter of Scripture give up the spiritual treasures.
It could not have been otherwise when the whole Christian religion, which Gregory
was called on to defend as a philosophy, had never before been systematically
so defended but by Origen; and this task, the same for both, was presented
to the same type of mind, in the same intellectual atmosphere. It would have
been strange indeed if Gregory had not been a pupil at least (though he was
no blind follower) of Origen.
If we take for illustration of this the most vital point in the vast system,
if system it can be called, of Origen, we shall see that he had traced fundamental
lines of thought, which could not in that age be easily left. He asserts the
virtual freedom of the human will, in every stage and condition of human existence.
The Greek philosophy of the third century, and the semi-pagan Gnosticism, in
their emanational view of the world, denied this freedom. With them the mind
of man, as one of the emanations of Deity itself, was, as much as the matter
of which the world was made, regulated and governed directly from the Source
whence they both flowed. Indeed every system of thought, not excepting Stoicism,
was struck with the blight of this fatalism. There was no freedom for man at
all but in the system which Origen was drawing from, or rather reading into,
the Scriptures. No Christian philosopher who lived amongst the same counter-influences
as Origen could overlook this starting-point of his system; he must have adopted
it, even if the danger of Pelagianism had been foreseen in it; which could
not have been the case.
Gregory
adopted it, with the other great doctrine which in the mind of Origen accompanied
it; i.e.,
that evil
is caused, not by matter, but by the act of
this free will of man; in other words, by sin. Again the fatalism of all the
emanationists had to be combated as to the nature and necessity of evil. With
them evil was some inevitable result of the Divine processes; it abode at all
events in matter, and human responsibility was at an end. Greek philosophy
from first to last had shewed, even at its best, a tendency to connect evil
with the lower <greek>Fusis</greek>. But now, in the light of revelation,
a new truth was set forth, and repeated again and again by the very men who
were inclined to adopt Plato's rather Dualistic division of the world into
the intelligible and sensible. ' Evil was due to an act of the will of man.'
Moreover it could no longer be regrded per se: it was relative, being a ' default,'
or ' failure,' or ' turning away from the true good' of the will, which, however,
was always free to rectify this failure. It was a <greek>sterhsis</greek>,--loss
of the good; but it did not stand over against the good as an independent power.
Origen contemplated the time when evil would cease to exist; 'the non-existent
cannot exist for ever:' and Gregory did the same.
This brings
us to yet another consequence of this enthusiasm for human freedom and responsibility,
which possessed
Origen, and carried Gregory away. The <greek>apokatastasis</greek> <greek>tpn</greek> <greek>pantwn</greek> has
been thought (1), in certain periods of the Church, to have been the only piece
of Origenism with which Gregory can be charged. [This of course shows ignorance
of the kind of influence which Gregory allowed Origen to have over him; and
which did not require him to select even one isolated doctrine of his master.]
It has also brought him into more suspicion than any other portion of his teaching.
Yet it is a direct consequence of the view of evil, which he shares with Origen.
If evil is the non-existent, as his master says, a <greek>sterhsis</greek>,
(1) as he says, then it must pass away. It was not made by God; neither is
it self-subsisting.
But when
it has passed away, what follows? That God will be "all in all." Gregory
accepts the whole of Origen's explanation of this great text. Both insist on
the impossibility of God being in ' everything,' if evil still remains. But
this is equivalent to the restoration to their primitive state of all created
spirits. Still it must be remembered that Origen required many future stages
of existence before all could arrive at such a consummation: with him there
is to be more than one 'next world;' and even when the primitive perfection
is reached, his peculiar view of the freedom of the will, as an absolute balance
between good and evil, would admit the possibility of another fall. 'All may
be saved; and all may fall.' How the final Sabbath shall come in which all
wills shall rest at last is but dimly hinted at in his writings. With Gregory,
on the other hand, there are to be but two worlds: the present and the next;
and in the next the <greek>apokatastas</greek>217><greek>s</greek> <greek>tpn</greek> <greek>pantwn</greek> must
be effected. Then, after the Resurrection, the fire <greek>akoimhtos</greek>, <greek>aiwnios</greek>,
as he continually calls it, will have to do its work. 'The avenging flame will
be the more ardent the more it has to consume' (De Anima et Resurr., p. 227).
But at last the evil will be annihilated, and the bad saved by nearness to
the good.' There is to rise a giving of thanks from all nature. Nevertheless
(2) passages have been adduced from Gregory's writings in which the language
of Scripture as to future punishment is used without any modification, or hint
of this universal salvation. In the treatise, De Pauperibus Amandis, II. p.
240, he says of the last judgment that God will give to each his due; repose
eternal to those who have exercised pity and a holy life; but the eternal punishment
of fire for the harsh and unmerciful: and addressing the rich who have made
a bad use of their riches, he says, 'Who will extinguish the flames ready to
devour you and engulf you? Who will stop the gnawings of a worm that never
dies?' Cf. aIso Orat. 3, de Beatitudinibus, I. p. 788: contra Ursuarios, II.
p. 233: though the hortatory character of these treatises makes them less important
as witnesses.
A single doctrine or group of doctrines, however, may be unduly pressed in
accounting for the influence of Origen upon a kindred spirit like Gregory.
Doubtless fragments of Origen's teaching, mere details very often, were seized
upon and appropriated by others; they were erected into dogmas and made to
do duty for the whole living fabric; and even those details were sometimes
misunderstood. ' (3) What he had said with a mind full of thought, others took
in the very letter.' Hence arose the evil of 'Origenism,' so prevalent in the
century in which Gregory lived. Different ways of following him were found,
bad and good. Even the Arians could find in his language now and then something
they could claim as their own. But as Rupp well says, 'Origen is not great
by virtue of those particular doctrines, which are usually exhibited to the
world as heretical by weak heads who think to take the measure of everything
with the mere formulae of orthodoxy. He is great by virtue of one single thought,
i.e. that of bringing philosophy into union with religion, and thereby creating
a theology. With Clement of Alexandria this thought was a mere instinct: Origen
gave it consciousness: and so Christendom began to have a science of its own.'
It was this single purpose, visible in all Origen wrote, that impressed itself
so deeply upon Gregory. He, too, would vindicate the Scriptures as a philosophy.
Texts, thanks to the labours of Origen as well as to the councils of the Church,
had now acquired a fixed meaning and an importance that all could acknowledge.
The new spiritual philosophy lay within them; he would make them speak its
language. Allegory was with him, just as with Origen, necessary, in order to
find the Spirit which inspires them. The letter must not impose itself upon
us and stand for more than it is worth; just as the practical experience of
evil in the world must not blind us to the fact that it is only a passing dispensation,
If only the animus and intention is regarded, we may say that all that Gregory
wrote was Origenistic.
II. But
nevertheless much had happened in the interval of 130 years that divides
them and this leads
us to consider
the limits which the state of the Church,
as well as Gregory's own originality and more extended physical knowledge,
placed upon the complete filling in of the outlines sketched by the master.
First and chiefly, Origen's doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul could
not be retained; and we know that Gregory not only abandoned it, but attacked
it with all his powers of logic in his treatise, De Animo et Resurrectione:
for which he receives the applause of the Emperor Justinian. Souls, according
to Origen, had pre-existed from eternity: they were created certainly, but
there never was a time when they did not exist: so that the procession even
of the Holy Spirit could in thought only be prior to their existence. Then
a failure of their free wills to grasp the true good, and a consequent cooling
of the fire of love within them, plunged them in this material bodily existence,
which their own sin made a suffering one. This view had certainly great merits:
it absolved the Deity from being the author of evil, and so was a ' theodicee;'
it entirely got rid of the two rival principles, good and evil, of the Gnostics;
and it avoided the seeming incongruity of what was to last for ever in the
future being not eternal in the past. Why then was it rejected? Not only because
of the objection urged by Methodius, that the addition of a body would be no
remedy but rather an increase of the sin; or that urged amongst many others
by Gregory, that a vice cannot be regarded as the precursor of the birth of
each human soul into this or into other worlds; but more than that and chiefly,
because such a doctrine contravened the more distinct views now growing up
as to what the Christian creation was, and the more careful definitions also
of the Trinity now embodied in the creeds. In fact the pre-existence of the
soul was wrapped up in a cosmogony that could no longer approve itself to the
Christian consciousness. In asserting the freedom of the will, and placing
in the will the cause of evil, Origen had so far banished emanationism; but
in his view of the eternity of the world, and in that of the eternal pre-existence
of souls which accompanied it, he had not altogether stamped it out. He connects
rational natures so closely with the Deity that each individual <greek>logos</greek> seems
almost, in a Platonic way, to lie in the Divine which (1) he styles <greek>ousia</greek> <greek>ousipn</greek>, <greek>idea</greek> <greek>idepn</greek>.
They are 'partial brightnesses (<greek>apaugasmapa</greek>) of
the glory of God.' He (2) allows them, of course, to have been created in the
Scriptural sense of that word, which is certainly an advance upon Justin; but
his creation is not that distinct event in time which Christianity requires
and the exacter treatment of the nature of the Divine Persons had now developed.
His creation, both the intelligible and visible world, receives from him an
eternity which is unnatural and incongruous in relation to his other speculations
and beliefs: it lingers, Tithonus-like, in the presence of the Divine Persons,
without any meaning and purpose for its life; it is the last relic of Paganism,
as it were, in a system which is otherwise Christian to the very core. His
strenuous effort to banish all ideas of time, at all events from the intelligible
world, ended in this eternal creation of that world; which seemed to join the
eternally generated Son too closely to it, and gave occasion to the Arians
to say that He too was a <greek>kpisma</greek>. This eternal pre-existence
in fact almost destroyed the idea of creation, and made the Deity in a way
dependent on His own world. Athanasius, therefore, and his followers were roused
to separate the divinity of the Son from everything created. The relation of
the world to God could no longer be explained in the same terms as those which
they employed to illustrate the relations between the Divine Persons; and when
once the doctrine of the consubstantiality of the Father and Son had been accepted
and firmly established there could be no more favour shown by the defenders
of that doctrine to the merely Platonic view of the nature and origin of souls
and of matter.
Amongst
the defenders of the Creed of Nicaea, Gregory, we know, stands well-nigh
foremost. In his
long and numerous
treatises on the Trinity he employs every
possible argument and illustration to show the contents of the substance of
the Deity as transcendent, incommunicable to creation per se. Souls cannot
have the attributes of Deity. Created spirits cannot claim immediate kindred
with the <greek>Logos</greek>. So instead of the Platonic antithesis
of the intelligible and sensible world, which Origen adopted, making all equal
in the intelligible world, he brings forward the antithesis of God and the
world. He felt too that that antithesis answers more fully not only to the
needs of the Faith in the Trinity daily growing more exact and clear, but also
to the facts of the Creation, i.e. its variety and differences. He gives up
the pre-existence of the rational soul; it will not explain the infinite variety
observable in souls. The variety, again, of the material world, full as it
is of the miracles of divine power, cannot have been the result of the chance
acts of created natures embodying themselves therein, which the theory of pre-existence
supposes. God and the created world (of spirits and matter) are now to be the
factors in theology; although Gregory does now and then, for mere purposes
of illustration, divide the Universe still into the intelligible and the sensible.
When once
pre-existence was given up, the parts of the soul could be more closely united
to each
other, because
the lower and higher were in their beginning
no longer separated by a gulf of ages. Accordingly Gregory, reducing the three
parts of man which Origen had used to the simpler division into visible and
invisible (sensible and intelligible), dwells much upon the intimate relation
between the two and the mutual action of one upon the other. Origen had retained
the trichotomy of Plato which other Greek Fathers also, with the sanction,
as they supposed, of S. Paul (1 Thess. v. 23), had adopted. 'Body,' 'soul,'
and 'spirit,' or Plato's ' body,' ' unreasoning' and ' reasoning soul,' had
helped Origen to explain how the last, the pre-existent soul (the spirit, or
the conscience (1), as he sometimes calls it) could ever have come to live
in the flesh. The second, the soul proper, is as it were a mediating ground
on which the spirit can meet the flesh. The celestial mind, ' the real man
fallen from on high,' rules by the power of conscience or of will over this
soul, where the merely animal functions and the natural appetites reside; and
through this soul over the body. How the celestial mind can act at all upon
this purely animal soul which lies between it and the body, Origen leaves unexplained.
But this division was necessary for him, in order to represent the spirit as
remaining itself unchanged in its heavenly nature, though weakened by its long
captivity in the body. The middle soul (in which he sometimes places the will)
is the scene of contamination and disorder; the spirit is free, it can always
rejoice at what is well done in the soul, and yet is not touched by the evil
in it; it chooses, convicts, and punishes. Such was Origen's psychology. But
an intimate connexion both in birth and growth between all the faculties of
man is one of Gregory's most characteristic thoughts, and he gave up this trichotomy,
which was still, however, retained by some Greek fathers, and adopted the simpler
division mentioned above in order more clearly and concisely to show the mutual
play of spirit and body upon each other. There was soon, too, another reason
why this trichotomy should be suspected. It was a second time made the vehicle
of error. Apollinaris adopted it, in order to expound that the Divine <greek>Logos</greek> took
the place, in the tripartite soul of Christ, of the 'reasonable soul' or spirit
of other men. Gregory, in pressing for a simpler treatment of man's nature,
thus snatched a vantage-ground from a sagacious enemy. His own psychology is
only one instance of a tendency which runs through the whole of his system,
and which may indeed be called the dominating thought with which he approached
every question; he views each in the light of form and matter; spirit penetrating
and controlling body, body answering to spirit and yet at the same time supplying
the nutriment upon which the vigour and efficacy of spirit, in this world at
least, depends. This thought underlies his view of the material universe and
of Holy Scripture, as well as of man's nature. With regard to the last he says,
'the intelligible cannot be realized in body at all, except it be commingled
with sensation; ' and again, 'as there can be no sensation without a material
substance, so there can be no exercise of the power of thought without sensation
(1).' The spiritual or intelligent part of man (which he calls by various names,
such as 'the inner man,' the <greek>yukh</greek> <greek>logikh</greek>, <greek>nous</greek> or <greek>dianoia</greek>, <greek>to</greek> <greek>zwopo</greek><ss217><greek>on</greek> <greek>aition</greek>,
or simply <greek>yskh</greek> as throughout the treatise On the
Soul), however alien in its essence from the bodily and sentient part, yet
no sooner is united with this earthly part than it at once exerts power over
it. In fact it requires this instrument before it can reach its perfection.
'Seeing, then, man is a reasoning animal of a certain kind, it was necessary
that the body should be prepared as an instrument appropriate to the needs
of his reason (2).' So closely has this reason been united with the senses
and the flesh that it performs itself the functions of the animal part; it
is the 'mind' or 'reason' itself that sees, hears, &c.; in fact the exercise
of mind depends on a sound state of the senses and other organs of the body;
for a sick body cannot receive the 'artistic' impressions of the mind and,
so, the mind remains inoperative. This is enough to show how far Gregory had
got from pre-existence and the 'fall into the prison of the flesh.'
His own theory of the origin of the soul, or at least that to which he visibly
inclines, is stated in the treatise, De Anima et Resurrectione, p. 241. It
is that of Tertullian and some Greek Fatherd also: and goes by the name of
'traducianism' The soul is transmitted in the generating seed. This of course
is the opposite pole to Origen's teaching, and is inconsistent with Gregory's
own spiritualism. The other alternative, Creationism, which a number of the
orthodox adopted, namely that souls are created by God at the moment of conception,
or when the body of the foetus is already formed, was not open to him to adopt;
because, according to him, in idea the world of spirits was made, and in a
determinate number, along with the world of unformed matter by the one creative
act 'in the beginning.' In the plan of the universe, though not in reality
as with Origen, all souls are already created. So the life of humanity contains
them: when the occasion comes they take their beginning along with the body
which enshrines them, but are not created then any more than that body. Such
was the compromise between spiritualism and materialism to which Gregory was
driven by the difficulties of the subject Origen with his eye unfalteringly
fixed upon the ideal world, and unconscious of the practical consequences that
might be drawn from his teaching, cut the knot with his eternal pre-existence
of souls, which avoided at once the alleged absurdity of creationism and the
grossness of traducianism. But the Church, for higher interests still than
those of pure idealism, had to reject that doctrine; and Gregory, with his
extended knowledge in physic and his close observation of the intercommunion
of mind and body, had to devise or rather select a theory which, though a makeshift,
would not contradict either his knowledge or his faith.
Yet after
admitting that soul and body are born together and attaching such importance
to the 'physical
basis'
of life and thought, the influence of his
master, or else his own uncontrollable idealism, carries him away again in
the opposite direction. After reading words in his treatise which Locke might
have written we come upon others which are exactly the teaching of Berkeley.
There is a passage in the De Anima et Resurrectione where he deals with the
question how an intelligent Being could have created matter, which is neither
intelligent or intelligible. But what if matter is only a concourse of qualities, <greek>ennoiai</greek>,
or <greek>Yila</greek> <greek>nohmata</greek> as he
elsewhere calls them? Then there would be no difficulty in understanding the
manner of creation. But even about this we can say so much, i.e. that not one
of those things which we attribute to body is itself body: neither figure,
nor colour, nor weight, nor extension, nor quantity, nor any other qualifying
notion whatever: but every one of them is a thought: it is the combination
of them all into a single whole that constitutes body. Seeing, then, that these
several qualifications which complete the particular body are grasped by thought
alone, and not by sense, and that the Deity is a thinking being, what trouble
can it be to such a thinking agent to produce the thoughts whose mutual combination
generate for us the substance of that body? and in the treatise, De Hom. Opif.,
c. 24, the intelligible <greek>fusis</greek> is said to produce
the intelligible <greek>dunameis</greek>, and the concourse of
these <greek>dunameis</greek> brings into being the material nature.
The body itself, he repeats (contra Fatum, p. 67), is not a real substance;
it is a soulless, unsubstantial thing. The only real creation is that of spirits.
Even Origen did not go so far as that Matter with him, though it exists by
concomitance and not by itself, nevertheless really exists. He avoided a rock
upon which Gregory runs; for with Gregory not only matter but created spirit
as well vanish in idealism. There remain with him only the and God.
This transcendent
idealism embarrasses him in many ways, and makes his theory of the soul full
of inconsistency.
(1) He will not say unhesitatingly whether
that pure humanity in the beginning created in the image of God had a body
or not like ours. Origen at all events says that the eternally pre-existing
spirits were invested with a body, even before falling into the sensible world.
But Gregory, while denying the pre-existenee of souls in the sense of Origen,
yet in many of his treatises, especially in the De Hom. Opificio, seems to
point to a primitive humanity, a predeterminate number of souls destined to
live in the body though they had not yet lived, which goes far beyond 0rigen's
in its ideal character. "When Moses," Gregory says, "speaks
of the soul as the image of God, he shows that all that is alien to God must
be excluded from our definition of the soul; and a corporal nature is alien
to God." He points out that God first 'made man in His own image,' and
after that made them male and female; so that there was a double fashioning
of our nature, <greek>h</greek> <greek>te</greek> <greek>pros</greek> <greek>to</greek> <greek>qeion</greek> <greek>omoiwmenh</greek>, <greek>h</greek> <greek>te</greek> <greek>pros</greek> <greek>thn</greek> <greek>diaForan</greek> <greek>tauthn</greek> (i.e.
male and female) <greek>dihrmenh</greek>. On the other hand, in
the Oratio Catechetica, which contains certainly his more dogmatic statement
on every point, this ideal and passionless humanity is regarded as still in
the future: and it is represented that man's double-nature is actually the
very centre of the Divine Councils, and not the result of any mistake or sin;
man's soul from the very first was cornmingled (<greek>anakrasis</greek> is
Gregory's favourite word) with a body, in order that in him, as representing
every stage of living things, the whole creation, even in its lowest part,
might share in the divine. Man, as the paragon of animals, was necessary, in
order that the union might be effected between two otherwise irreconcilable
worlds, the intelligible and the sensible. Though, therefore, there was a Fall
at last, it was not the occasion of man's receiving a body similar to animals;
that body was given him at the very first, and was only preparatory to the
Fall, which was foreseen in the Divine Councils and provided for. Both the
body and the Fall were necessary in order that the Divine plan might be carried
out, and the Divine glory manifested in creation. In this view the "coats
of skins" which Gregory inherits from the allegorical treasures of Origen
are no longer merely the human body itself, as with Origen, but all the passions,
actions, and habits of that body after the Fall, which he sums up in the generic
term <greek>paqh</greek>. If, then, there is to be any reconciliation
between this and the former view of his in which the pure unstained humanity,
the 'image of God,' is differentiated by a second act of creation as it were
into male and female, we must suppose him to teach that immediately upon the
creation in God's image there was added all that in human nature is akin to
the merely animal world. In that man was God's image, his will was free, but
in that he was created, he was able to fall from his high estate; and God,
foreseeing the Fall, at once added the distinction of sex, and with it the
other features of the animal which would befit the fall; but with the purpose
of raising thereby the whole creation. But two great counter-influences seem
always to be acting upon Gregory; the one sympathy with the speculations of
Origen, the other a tendency to see even with a modern insight into the closeness
of the intercommunion between soul and body. The results of these two influences
cannot be altogether reconciled. His ideal and his actual man, each sketched
with a skilful and discriminating hand, represent the interval that divides
his aspirations from his observations: yet both are present to his mind when
he writes about the soul. (2) He does not alter, as Origen does, the traditional
belief in the resurrection of the body, and yet his idealism, in spite of his
actual and strenuous defence of it in the carefully argued treatise On the
Saul and Resurrection, renders it unnecessary, if not impossible. We know that
his faith impelled Origen, too, to (1) contend for the resurrection of the
flesh: yet it is an almost forced importation into the rest of his system.
Our bodies, he teaches, will rise again: but that which will make us the same
persons we were before is not the sameness of our bodies (for they will be
ethereal, angelic, uncarnal, &c.) but the sameness of a <greek>logos</greek> within
them which never dies (<greek>logos</greek> <greek>tis</greek> <greek>egkeitai</greek> <greek>tp</greek> <greek>swmati</greek>, <greek>af</greek>' <greek>ou</greek> <greek>mh</greek> <greek>fqeiromenou</greek> <greek>egeir</greek><ss209><greek>tai</greek> <greek>to</greek> <greek>spma</greek> <greek>en</greek> <greek>afqarsia</greek>,
c. Cels. v. 23). Here we have the <greek>logos</greek> <greek>spermatikoi</greek>,
which Gregory objected to as somehow connected his mind with the infinite plurality
of worlds. Yet his own account of the Resurrection of the flesh is nothing
but Origenism, mitigated by the suppression of these <greek>logoi</greek>.
With him, too, matter is nothing, it is a negative thing that can make and
effect nothing: the soul, the <greek>zwtikh</greek> <greek>dunamis</greek> does
everything; it is gifted by him with a sort of ubiquity after death. 'Nothing
can break its sympathetic union with the particles of the body.' It is not
a long and difficult study for it to discern in the mass of elements that which
is its own from that which is not its own. 'It watches over its property, as
it were, until the Resurrection, when it will clothe 'itself in them anew (2).'
It is only a change of names: the <greek>logos</greek> has become
this <greek>zwtikh</greek> <greek>dunamis</greek> or <greek>Yukh</greek>,
which seems itself, almost unaided, to effect the whole Resurrection. Though
he teaches as against Origen that the 'elements' are the same 'elements,' the
body the same body as before, yet the strange importance both in activity and
in substance which he attaches to the <greek>Yukh</greek> even
in the disembodied state seems to render a Resurrection of the flesh unnecessary.
Here, too, his view of the plan of Redemption is at variance with his idealistic
leanings. While Origen regarded the body, as it now is, as part of that 'vanity'
placed upon the creature which was to be laid aside at last, Gregory's view
of the design of God in creating man at all absolutely required the Resurrection
of the flesh 3 (<greek>ws</greek> <greek>an</greek> <greek>suneparqeih</greek> <greek>tw</greek> <greek>qeiw</greek> <greek>to</greek> <greek>ghinon</greek>).
Creation was to be saved by man's carrying his created body into a higher world:
and this could only be done by a resurrection of the flesh such as the Church
had already set forth in her creed.
Again, however, after parting with Origen upon this point, he meets him in
the ultimate contemplation of Christ's glorified humanity and of all glorified
bodies. Both steadily refuse at last 'to know Christ according to the flesh.'
They depict His humanity as so absorbed in deity that all traces of His bodily
nature vanish; and as with Christ, so finally with His true followers. This
is far indeed from the Lamb that was slain, and the vision of S. John. In this
heaven of theirs all individual or generic differences between rational creatures
necessarily cease.
Great, then, as are their divergences, especially in cosmogony, their agreements
are maintained throughout. Gregory in the main accepts Origen's teaching, as
far as he can accommodate it to the now more outspoken faith of the Church.
What (4) Redepenning summarises as the groundplan of Origen's whole way of
thinking, Gregory has, with the necessary changes, appropriated. Both regard
the history of the world as a movement between a beginning and an end in which
are united every single spiritual or truly human nature in the world, and the
Divine nature. This interval of movement is caused by the falling away of the
free will of the creature from the divine: but it will come to an end, in order
that the former union may be restored. In this summary they would differ only
as to the closeness of the original trojan. Both, too, according to this, would
regard 'man' as the final cause, and the explanation, and the centre of God's
plan in creation.
Even in
the special sphere of theology which the later needs of the Church forced
into prominence, and
which Gregory
has made peculiarly his own, that
of the doctrine of the Trinity, Gregory employs sometimes a method which he
has caught from Origen. Origen supposes, not so much, as Plato did, that things
below are images of things above, as that they have certain secret analogies
or affinities with them. This is perhaps after all only a peculiar application
for his own purpose of Plato's theory of ideas. There are mysterious sympathies
between the earth and heaven. We must therefore read within ourselves the reflection
of truths which are too much beyond our reach to know in themselves. with regard
to the attributes of God this is more especially the case. But Origen never
had the occasion to employ this language in explaining the mystery of the Trinity.
Gregory is the first Father who has done so. He finds a key to it in the (1)
triple nature of our soul. The <greek>nous</greek>, the <greek>logos</greek>,
and the soul, form within us a unity such as that of the Divine hypostases.
Gregory himself confesses that such thoughts about God are inadequate, and
immeasurably below their object: but he cannot be blamed for employing this
method, as if it was entirely superficial. Not only does this instance illustrate
trinity in unity, but we should have no contents for our thought about the
Father, Son, and Spirit, if we found no outlines at all of their nature within
ourselves. Denis (2) well says that the history of the doctrine of the Trinity
confirms this: for the advanced development of the theory of the <greek>logos</greek>,
a purely human attribute in the ancient philosophy, was the cause of the doctrine
of the Son being so soon and so widely treated: and the doctrine of the Holy
Spirit came into prominence only when He began to be regarded as the principle
of the purely human or moral life, as Love, that is, or Charity. Gregory, then,
had reason in recommending even a more systematic use of the method which he
had received from Origen: 'Learn from the things within thee to know the secret
of God; recognise from the Triad within thee the Triad by means of these matters
which you realise: it is a testimony above and more sure than that of the Law
and the Gospel (3).'
He carries out elsewhere also more thoroughly than Origen this method of reading
parables. He is an actual Mystic in this. The mysterious but real correspondences
between earth and heaven, upon which, Origen had taught, and not upon mere
thoughts or the artifices of language, the truth of a parable rests, Gregory
employed, in order to penetrate the meaning of the whole of external nature.
He finds in its facts and appearances analogies with the energies, and through
them with the essence, of God. They are not to him merely indications of the
wisdom which caused them and ordered them, but actual symptoms of the various
energies which reside in the essence of the Supreme Being; as though that essence,
having first been translated into the energies, was through them translated
into the material creation; which was thus an earthly language saying the same
thing as the heavenly language, word for word. The whole world thus became
one vast allegory (4): and existed only to manifest the qualities of the Unseen.
Akin to this peculiar development of the parable is another characteristic
of his, which is alien to the spirit of Origen; his delight in natural scenery,
his appreciation of it, and power of describing it.
With regard
to the question, so much agitated, of the 'A<greek>pokatastasis</greek>,
it may be said that not Gregory only but Basil and Gregory Nazianzen also have
felt the influence of their master in theology, Origen. But it is due to the
latter to say that though he dwells much on the "all in all" and
insists much more on the sanctifying power of punishment than on the satisfaction
owed to Divine justice, yet no one could justly attribute to him, as a doctrine,
the view of a Universal Salvation. Still these Greek Fathers, Origen and 'the
three great Cappadocians,' equally showed a disposition of mind that left little
room for the discussions that were soon to agitate the West. Their infinite
hopes, their absolute confidence in the goodness of God, who owes it to Himself
to make His work perfect, their profound faith in the promises and sacrifice
of Christ, as well as in the vivifying action of the Holy Spirit, make the
question of Predestination and Grace a very simple one with them. The word
Grace occurs as often in them as in Augustine: but they do not make original
sin a monstrous innovation requiring a remedy of a peculiar and overwhelming
intensity. Passion indeed seems to Gregory of Nyssa himself one of the essential
elements of the human soul. He borrows from the naturalists many principles
of distinction between classes of souls and lives: he insists incessantly on
the intimate connexion between the physical growth and the development of the
reason, and on the correlation between the one and the other: and we arrive
at the conclusion that man in his eyes, as in Clement's, was not originally
perfect, except in possibility; that being at once reasoning and sentient he
must perforce feel within himself the struggle of reason and passion, and that
it was inevitable that sin should enter into the world: it was a consequence
of his mixed nature. This mixed nature of the first man was transmitted to
his descendants. Here, though he stands apart from Origen on the question of
man's original perfection, he could not have accepted the whole Augustinian
scheme of original sin: and Grace as the remedy with him consists rather in
the purging this mixed nature, than in the introduction into it of something
absolutely foreign. The result, as with all the Greek Fathers, will depend
on the co-operation of the free agent in this remedial work. Predestination
and the 'bad will' are excluded by the Possibility and the 'free will' of Origen
and Gregory.
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